![captain sim no vspd captain sim no vspd](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/CX9evmTwz8s/maxresdefault.jpg)
On the GIV it is not uncommon to takeoff flaps 10 (think there was a whole tread on this some time ago). wondering if the flaps were actually at 10 though oddly put that the flaps were set in the cockpit to 10. The only thing missing is the close out cover on the right actuator from what I can see. The thrust reverse's are fully intact in the picture you posted. Looking at it close up, it is clear the the reverser is missing from the right engine, but is in place on the left engine. Has anyone noticed that the thrust reverser on the right engine in missing? Take a look at the picture: Nobody teaches you that the critical AOA is different, but if anything I would expect the angle to be higher, not lower, because performance is generally enhanced in ground effect.Īnyway, I hope that clears it up a bit.
#Captain sim no vspd free
My question was: give what happened with the G650, is it possible the IGE critical angle was also mis-computed on the G-IV? It seems that even Gulfstream didn't realize how different the critical AOA can be in ground effect versus in free air. Johnson's account was given more than a quarter century after the test program ended), but they solved the issue with vortex generators. On the G-IV, it's less clear about why the wing stall occurred (Mr. On the 650, they computed the wrong critical AOA in ground effect. Of course, that's exactly why testing is performed: to validate those assumptions. In other words, it's not the aircraft that is at fault, but rather some of the assumptions made about it during testing. What I was trying to convey with the post was that the G-IV test program suffered from a wing drop problem during OEI continued-takeoff testing whose cause was also attributed incorrectly by the engineers. I hope the article didn't give you the impression that Gulfstreams are poorly designed or prone to random stalls. For a relatively short flight from Bedford to Atlantic city it is likely the aircraft only had a 10,000lb fuel load which would result in a BFL less than 4,000ft. In the case of this GIV accident the fact that the aircraft appears to have come to rest (with considerable energy) some 2,000 ft beyond the departure end of a 7,011 ft runway makes me think this may not have been an aborted take-off over run. As Susier correctly points out the 650 accident had nothing to do with its flight control system, rather just incorrect performance calculations. In the case of the 650 program this resulted in several wing drops during flight testing that were initially attributed to incorrect pilot technique, it took a tragic accident to "wake up" the engineers and get them to re-examine their calculations and uncover their erroneous assumptions regarding in ground effect stall AOA and V2 speeds. The net result of this was that the flight test crews were making aggressive rotations and steep climb outs in an attempt to not exceed the targeted V2 speeds and achieve the lowest possible balanced field length numbers for the aircraft. The issue with the G650/GIV you are referring to was the flight engineers incorrectly calculating the V2 speeds too high as well as making an incorrect assumption as to the stall AOA in ground effect. Therefore, the pilot likely wanted to make the most of every revenue generating opportunity." Additionally, due to the economic downturn, the pilot’s company had lost millions of dollars during the 3 years before the accident. Thus, the pilot would have been highly motivated to complete trips as requested so that he could demonstrate the reliability of his service. The pilot was also aware that his largest customer had begun identifying other aviation companies that might better fulfill its needs. The pilot was scheduled to meet with this customer in the coming weeks to obtain clarification about the customer’s requirements. The operator’s only IFR certified helicopter, which was the largest customer’s preferred helicopter, had been down for maintenance for 4 months while the operator attempted to secure loans for engine maintenance. The accident helicopter had been leased days before the accident. The operator’s business had declined several years before the accident as a result of economic recession. "The pilot’s financial pressure as the owner of the company likely influenced his decision to continue flight into deteriorating weather conditions. Quote from NTSB Report RE Aircraft operated by SK Jets: Not sure if it has any bearing on this accident but it certainly raises some questions?